UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-22-2010

State v. Jackson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36968

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Jackson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36968" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1231.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1231

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 36968

)

v.

)

PONY L. JACKSON,

)

)

REPLY BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CLARK

HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 7259
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3
The State Violated Mr. Jackson's Right To A Fair Trial By
Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct ............................................................. 3

A. The Standard Articulated in State v. Perry ................................................. 3
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Explicitly Held That The New
Standard Of Review Is Not Retroactive And, Therefore,
The New Standard Articulated In The Perry Decision
Does Not Apply ..................................................................................... 3
2. Assuming Arguendo Perry Applies ....................................................... 4
B. The Prosecutor's Comments Which Mr. Jackson Asserts
Were An Impermissible Comment On Silence And
Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The
Jury Were Not Ambiguous, But Clearly Offered For An
Improper Purpose ...................................................................................... 5
C. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Violating A District
Court Order
........................................................................................ 7
CONCLUSiON ...................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFIC"JE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) ........................................................ 3
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,825 P.2d 1073 (1991) ....................................... 4
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) ............................................................ .4
Perry, 2010 WL 2880156, p.16, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at _ ............................. 4
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233p.3d 61 (2010) ......................................... 3
State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,236 P.3d 1269 (2010) ................................... .4
State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, p.15, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d
_

(July 23, 201 0) ......................................................................................... 3, 4

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................................................................... 4

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pony Jackson asserts that the State violated his right to a fair trial by committing
prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Jackson had
a fair trial not by submitting only competent, admissible evidence to the jury, but instead
commented that Mr. Jackson failed to present evidence of his innocence, encroached
upon the province of the jury by denying them of their right to be the ultimate judges of
the credibility of the witnesses, blatantly disregarded the district court's order prohibiting
the use of overly prejudicial evidence, and appealed to the passions and prejudices of
the jury asking that they not punish the alleged victim. Mr. Jackson contends that the
misconduct committed in his case constituted fundamental error and was not harmless.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that the standards
articulated in State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, _
P.3d _

Idaho _, _

(July 23, 2010) (reh'g pending), apply in this case; that prosecutorial

misconduct related to vouching does not implicate a constitutional right; that statements
by the prosecutor, made for an obviously improper purpose, where presented for
another purpose; and that the State did not violate a district court order.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Jackson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the State violate Mr. Jackson's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
The State Violated Mr. Jackson's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct

A.

The Standard Articulated In State v. Perry
State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, p.15, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d

_ (July 23, 2010) (reh'g pending) holds that unobjected to errors will be reviewed if the
defendant demonstrates that his unwaived constitutional right was plainly violated. The
three-prong inquiry requires the defendant to demonstrate that the alleged error:
U(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists; and (3) was not harmless." Id. p.17. The defendant must prove that the error
was not harmless by demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial." Id. at 16.

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court Explicitly Held That The New Standard Of
Review Is Not Retroactive And; Therefore, The New Standard Articulated
In The Perry Decision Does Not Apply

The Court stated, U[t]his restatement shall not be given retroactive application"
and cited to the holding in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 292 (2008), for the
proposition that State courts were free to develop their own rules of retroactivity. Perry,
2010 WL 2880156, p.8, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at _.

This Court adopted the Teague 1

standard to resolve retroactive application to those cases on collateral review.
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010).

In Rhoades, this Court

recognized the valid distinction of cases pending on direct review and those that were
final before the issuance of the new law. Id. Recently, this Court recognized the United
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States Supreme court precedent holding that a new rule should be applied to all cases
still pending on direct review.

State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,515,236 P.3d 1269,

1275 (2010) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)). However, the rules of
retroactive and prospective application generally only apply to a rule of "constitutional
dimension." Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,420-21, 825 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (1991)
(Bistline, Justice, dissenting).
In Perry, this Court did not hold that the new standard of review is one of
constitutional dimension. Perry, 2010 WL 2880156, p.16, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at_.
Additionally, the Court held that the new standard is not retroactive. When the Court
made no other clarification or limitation on the non-retroactive holding, the plain
language of Perry requires the application to only be applied prospectively and,
therefore, inapplicable to those trials occurring prior to the Remittitur being issued in the
Perry Opinion. Therefore, by the plain language of the Perry decision, the new standard

of review is not applicable to this case because Mr. Jackson's trial occurred before the
Perry opinion became final.

2.

Assuming Arguendo Perry Applies

The errors in this case relate directly to Mr. Jackson's unwaived constitutional
rights. First, it is a violation of Mr. Jackson's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial
and the law as explained in the jury instructions. Id. As such, prosecutorial misconduct,
in general, directly violates a constitutional right.

In this case, misconduct related to

vouching and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury also interfered with

1

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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the jury's ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Jackson's
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Further, the misconduct relating to

Mr. Jackson's failure to prove his innocence, in a case where only Mr. Jackson and the
alleged victim can testify about the alleged incidents, amounts to a comment on silence
and is a violation of Mr. Jackson's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. As such, the
misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Jackson's unwaived constitutional rights.
The error in this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information
is necessary. It cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury
reach a verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible
grounds presented through misconduct.
Additionally, the errors are not harmless.

The harmless error standard and

arguments in support were articulated in section E of the Appellant's Brief and are
incorporated herein by reference.
Therefore, under the new standard articulated in Perry, the prosecutorial
misconduct in this case is fundamental and . requires that his case be remanded for a
new trial.

B.

The Prosecutor's Comments Which Mr. Jackson Asserts Were An Impermissible
Comment On Silence And Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The
JUry Were Not Ambiguous, But Clearly Offered For An Improper Purpose
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: "Did we hear any testimony that

it didn't happen? I don't recall hearing any testimony that it didn't happen. The only
testimony I recall was that it happened." (Tr., p.356, Ls.12-15.) The State has argued
that the prosecutor's statement was "at best, ambiguous" and that ambiguous argument
cannot constitute misconduct.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-S.)
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Mr. Perry asserts that

above comment is not at all ambiguous. Had the prosecutor wished to comment on an
officer's testimony about Mr. Jackson's statements during the investigation, as the State
suggests, he could have done so.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-9.)

plainly not what the prosecutor is discussing.

However, that is

The prosecutor used the term "any

testimony" twice. While the State might like to argue to this Court that "any" means a
single specific piece of testimony, it means "any."

The plain meaning of the statement

directly implies that Mr. Jackson did not present any evidence of his innocence, which is
an impermissible comment on silence. As such, the statement is not ambiguous.
The State also made a similar argument in regards to the prosecutor's statement,
"And she ought not to be held or punished again for waiting to come forward."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-13; Tr., p. 342, Ls.1-2.) Again, the State asserts that the
statement was "at best, ambiguous" and that ambiguous argument cannot constitute
misconduct.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.)

The prosecutor could have made the

statement that just because there was a delay in reporting, it does not mean that she is
not credible. However, the prosecutor did not make this statement. And, contrary to the
State's assertion, using the words "she ought not be held or punished again" does
transform what could have been a legitimate argument into a constitutional violation.
The plain and unambiguous purpose of this statement was to request that the jury find
the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim. Such a comment is misconduct and
deprived Mr. Jackson of his constitutional right to an impartial jury and a fair trial.
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C.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Violating A District Court Order
The State asserts that, "[t]he prosecutor never mentioned nor solicited evidence

in violation of the court's order."

(Respondent's Brief, p.4.)

The following is the

discussion surrounding, and the district court's order, on this issue:
MR. SIMPSON (Prosecutor): Okay. The other issue I've got is,
Kendra Ward, she is now 21. This happened when she was four years
old. The way this came about is, is that a couple of years ago, in 2007,
she was watching the news and Pony Jackson had been arrested for child
pornography and the news said if anyone out there has been molested by
Pony Jackson, would you please contact the law enforcement. I mean,
that's kind of my paraphrasing of it.
And so my question is, is I'm sure Todd's [defense counsel] is
going to object if that - to that kind of information coming in; and I just - I
want to know the boundaries of this. Again, I don't want any mistrials or
appealable issues. Do you want me to avoid that issue unless Todd
raises it? I mean, I think I can get - I think I can say, "Did you contact law
enforcement and for what reason did you contact law enforcement,"
without getting into the THE COURT: Right. If you can, I mean, that's going to be much
better. It's going to be problematic if she's - if this evidence of
charges for child pornography come in because that can be unfairly
prejudicial. I mean, certainly she can testify that she became aware that
he was involved. WellMR. SIMPSON: Yeah. I mean, how do we - how does the jury
understand that all of a sudden she - because I think part of Todd's
defense is that why wait all this time and then all of a sudden you do it. So
howdo 1THE COURT: Well, she can testify - and this may take some
coaching on your part so we don't get into a problem - but that she
saw a report about Pony Jackson and MR. SIMPSON: But don't mention it was on child pornography; she
saw a report?
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography
issues but that he was involved - that was - that he was involved there was a law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony Jackson and
that prompted her to come forward, something general and
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innocuous like that. Certainly she can talk about this was generated
by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she can stay away from the
charges, we're going to be a lot better off.
MR. SIMPSON: Okay. I think I can coach her on that. I talked to
her about that yesterday too. And, of course, a lot of that depends on
what you ask her on cross-examination, what I can get into, I'm assuming,
after that. But that's the way - those are my THE COURT: So, I mean, that - the evidence of prior crimes and
prior acts can come in if the door gets opened on that. But, I mean, right
now that - you want to treat that as being unfairly prejudicial, the
prejudice doesn't outweigh the probative value. But if there's a door
gets [sic] opened, then that does come in.
(Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.36, L.1 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Jackson concedes that the district court did not specifically state that the
prosecution could not have witnesses claim that the television report was about
Mr. Jackson molesting children. However, the prosecution was ordered to solicit only
information that the alleged victim reported the offense because of a "law enforcement
inquiry" and to "stay away from the charges."

The district court also noted that the

prosecutor should coach his witnesses to say only "something general and innocuous."
Repeated references to the molestation of others are not innocuous and were prohibited
at the heart of the order. The State's argument that solicitation of even more prejudicial
answers is not a violation of the order is without merit. The intention of the district court
was abundantly clear and the prosecution's distortion of the order for the purpose of
admitting overly prejudicial evidence is misconduct and shows complete malevolence
on the part of the prosecutor.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 22 nd day of November, 2010.

ELIZABETH ANN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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